We compare international monetary arrangements that differ in the degree of both policy activism and exchange rate flexibility in a model with policy credibility, nominal wage rigidities and unobservable shocks. Three results stand out. First, the selection of the exchange rate regime is less important than the choice of the degree of activism. Second, unlike conventional wisdom, activistic policies tend to fare worse than passive ones. And third, a passive, fixed exchange rate system has good properties for macroeconomic stability. The results suggest that when the monetary authorities operate under conditions of incomplete information, a passive, fixed exchange rate regime represents a good overall choice.
Introduction
There has been considerable variation in international monetary practices both over time and across countries. Some of this variation has been associated with the establishment -and subsequent demise-of global systems of fixed parities (the Gold Standard and the Bretton Woods agreement), or large regional monetary systems (EMS, EMU). But much of the variation is related to individual countries' desire to select an exchange rate arrangement that best suits their particular needs. As economic structures, domestic and international economic conditions and policy objectives differ across countries, it is not surprising that different countries opt for different international monetary arrangements 1 . A good example of this are the monetary practices of Hong Kong and Singapore.
Hong Kong has a currency board, while Singapore has a managed float. While this difference may seem puzzling given the similarities between these two economies, there exist important differences across the two countries that may justify the observed differences in policy preferences. Namely, Singapore has a large manufacturing (electronics) sector while Hong Kong does not. There is a presumption in the literature that a large manufacturing sector requires activistic policy in order to manage the real exchange rate.
The objective of this paper is to offer a general evaluation of the presumption in favor of an activistic flexible exchange rate regime in the presence of plausible, practical limitations to the conduct of monetary policy 2 . Namely, when the monetary authorities do not have perfect information about the nature of the disturbances that hit the economy under consideration. Under such circumstances, it is quite plausible that a key attribute of the flexible regime that has been identified in the literature, namely that it can help eliminate -partly or completely-the effects of various existing distortions (Devereux and 1 The last few years have witnessed a proliferation of research on the properties of alternative exchange rate regimes (Bacchetta and van-Wincoop, 2000 , Benigno and Benigno, 2000 , Collard and Dellas, 2001 , Devereux, 1999 , Devereux and Engel, 2000 , Duarte, 2000 , Gali and Monacelli, 2000 , Pappa, 2001 , Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000 , Stockman and Ohanian, 1994 , Taylor, 1993 2 It should be noted that the recent literature has identified a presumption in favor of the f ixed regime under conditions of imperfect competition and local currency pricing; see Devereux and Engel, 2000 . Engel, 2000 , Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000 , is not present.
Without "omnipotent" policy, we find that indeed there is no longer a presumption in favor of the flexible regime. And that the choice of the degree of exchange rate flexibility is less important than the domestic dimension of the central bank operating procedure.
In general, simple monetary targeting (domestic or global) generates the highest level of welfare. The standard Taylor rule -with or without exchange rate flexibility-fares significantly worse and its performance decreases with the degree of inflation targeting.
As expected, given the source of nominal frictions, nominal wage targeting does much better than inflation targeting but it still falls -slightly-short of monetary targeting.
Finally, a fixed exchange rate regime with global money targeting generates the most stable level of real economic activity.
These findings have implications for the issue of international policy coordination raised in a recent paper by Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001 . Obstfeld and Rogoff argue 3 that in situations where global monetary policy can replicate the flexible wage equilibrium, "...lack of coordination in rule setting is a second-order problem compared to the gains from macroeconomic stabilization.." Neither of these elements seems essential for the -un-importance of policy coordination. Namely, the lack of international coordination is not costly in our model, in spite of the fact that the monetary authorities cannot replicate the flexible price equilibrium. And, moreover, international coordination is a second order problem in spite of the fact that activistic domestic policies are dominated by passive rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 reports the main findings.
The model
We use a fairly standard two country model 4 . The main differences from the models typically employed in this literature are the following: First, we assume that the shocks are not observable. Second, we allow for a general specification of preferences because the commonly used assumption of a logarithmic, or in general, separable, utility has critical -and implausible-implications for the key price in the model, the nominal exchange rate (see Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2000, or Devereux, 1999) as well as for the properties of monetary policy (Gali, 2001) . And third, we rely on perfect rather than imperfect competition in goods markets 5 .
The household
We describe the behavior of the domestic agents. That of the foreign agents' is completely analogous. The household's problem is given by:
where π(s t+τ |s t ) denotes the conditional probability of occurrence of state s t+τ conditional on the current state being s t . C(s t ) is consumption, M (s t ) is money and 4 We use a two country model instead of a small open economy one in order to be able to directly compare our results to those in the existing literature. The recent exchange rate regime comparison literature which has been almost exclusively conducted within the context of two country models.
5 The assumption of imperfect competition is valuable when one wants to model goods price setting in an optimal fashion. It would not contribute much here because the nominal friction is in wages, while at the same time introducing unnecessary -for the purposes of this paper -complications; see Woodford, 2000 . With this specification we can introduce "money -demand-shocks" by allowing the weigh of the real balance term in the utility function, ζ t , to vary stochastically.
The optimal behavior of the household is then characterized by
where Λ t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint and E t (.) de-
Note that
The nominal interest rate can be written
Using the definition of the interest rate in the money demand, and making use of (1), the money demand equation takes the form
We will assume that nominal wages get fixed one period in advance at the level w (w in the foreign economy) that corresponds to the expected market clearing wage 6 .
That is, nominal wages are set using labor contracts of the form
W t is the nominal wage that would clear the labor market under flexible wages. The fixed wage then replaces equation (2) as the workers must supply the quantity of labor demanded by the firms and they are no longer on their labor supply schedule.
The problem of the foreign household is completely analogous to that of the domestic one.
1.2 The firms
Intermediate good firms
There are two types of firms, those which produce an intermediate good and those that produce a final good.
The first type of firms specializes in the production of a homogeneous intermediate good according to:
where A t is a stationary, exogenous, stochastic technology shock.
The representative firm chooses how much labor to lease in period t in order to maximize current profits
where P Xt is the price of the domestic intermediate good. 6 We could have instead allowed for multi-period wage rigidity a la Calvo, as in Collard and Dellas, 2002. We chose not to do so for a simple reason. Most of the related literature uses one period contracts. Making the same assumption here allows us to uncover the distinct role played by incomplete information. This is an important consideration because multi-period price setting generates a complicated relationship between the degree of price (or wage) staggering and the properties of the exchange rate regimes. While this is an interesting issue, it has been dealt with elsewhere (see Collard and Dellas, 2001) . Finally, note that we could have alternatively postulated that wages are set at a level that maximizes utility rather than at a level that is expected to clear the future labor market. This would not alter the results.
Each intermediate good is then used in the production of final goods in both countries according to the following restriction:
where X H F t denotes the amount of domestic intermediate good that is used in the production of the foreign final good in period t and so on.
Final good firms
The domestic final good Y t is produced according to
The level of production is selected in order to maximize profits: 
Clearing of the domestic final good market requires:
where G is domestic government expenditure.
The problem of the foreign firms is completely analogous. The foreign final good market clears when:
where G * is foreign government expenditure.
The government
In each and every period, the home government acquires an amount G t of the final good. Government expenditure follows an exogenously determined stochastic, stationary process:
with |ρ g | < 1 and ε gt N (0, σ g ).
Expenditures are financed by means of lump-sum taxation:
Similar equations characterize the behavior of the foreign government.
Monetary policy
We study combinations of two "domestic" and two international monetary arrangements.
The two domestic procedures are monetary targeting and a Taylor rule. That is,
where M t is the money supply and P t and Y t represent deviations from the inflation and output targets respectively.
The two international arrangements are a flexible system and a bilateral peg 7 . In the latter case, the monetary authorities either jointly target the "world" money supply subject to the constraint that the exchange rate must remain fixed. Or, they are allowed to operate a Taylor rule again but under the constraint that the exchange rate must remain fixed.
Finally, for the sake of completeness, we also consider a Taylor type of rule that targets the nominal wage, under both a flexible and a fixed exchange rate regime. This rule takes the form
where W t is the nominal wage rate.
The equilibrium
We will assume that both economies are of the same size, and that initial wealth is equally distributed across countries, so that Λ t = e t Λ t
The equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions together with the equations describing the conduct of monetary policy.
Definition 1 An equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices
and a sequence of quantities
and 7 We have also computed welfare in the case of a unilateral peg when the anchor country follows a Taylor rule. The results are available upon request. clears the goods markets (v) Monetary policy is conducted according to the procedures described in section 1.4
The solution
We log-linearize the model around the deterministic steady state. For simplicity we assume that there is no growth in the economy (real or nominal) and set the inflation and output target equal to zero 8 . Moreover, we assume that the two countries are perfectly symmetric. The structure of the shocks is as follows 9 :
The technology shock in each country follows the process 10 :
with |ρ a | < 1 and ε at N (0, σ a ).
The money demand shock follows:
with |ρ z | < 1 and ε zt N (0, σ z ).
And finally, the government spending shock is given by
with |ρ g | < 1 and ε gt N (0, σ g ). 
The results
We solve the log-linearized model and then use the computed variance-covariance matrix of C, , M/P and ζ in a quadratic approximation of the utility function (the approximation is taken around the deterministic steady state; see Collard and Dellas, 2001 ).
The top row in table 1 reports the level of welfare associated with each shock for each of the six monetary arrangements (for the benchmark case). The row immediately below reports the cost of volatility in terms of steady state consumption.
Several features stand out. First, conditional on a particular domestic policy procedure, there are no significant welfare differences across exchange rate regimes. There exist significant differences across activistic and passive policies, though, specially for supply shocks. Second, the highest welfare score for supply and fiscal shocks is achieved with M-targeting under a flexible regime but M-targeting also does quite well under a fixed regime. And third, wage targeting also does well while a standard inflation targeting rule a la Taylor rule results in significantly lower welfare. Gali, 2001 , reports that money targeting has good properties (relative to interest rate targeting) under supply and fiscal shocks in a closed economy. We find that this good performance is also present in an open economy and that it is independent of the exchange rate regime in place.
As stressed by Woodford, 2000, welfare comparisons require a lot of faith in the chosen model specification-parameterization. Comparisons based on macroeconomics performance, on the other hand, tend to be considerably more robust. Consequently, we have also used the model solution to compare the various policy regimes in terms of a more traditional criterion, namely macroeconomic volatility. Table 2 reports the standard deviation of output, employment, the CPI, the terms of trade and the nominal interest rate. Several results are worth reporting.
First, with the exception of employment, the global monetarist peg and the wage targeting regimes produce the best results. Second, the differences across monetary regimes are quite substantial (for output, for instance, they are as high as 15%). Third, unlike the welfare comparisons, the differences can now be large both across international regimes (the fixed performing better) and across "domestic" policy rules. Based on both the welfare and the volatility results, one could claim that a global monetarist, fixed regime represents a good choice under conditions of incomplete information. peg or a nominal wage target produces significantly superior performance 14 . Moreover, 14 We do not think, however, that the real world properties of a nominal wage targeting rule are as good as they appear here because the sources of nominal rigidities as well as their relative size are in practice unknown. It can be shown that, in our model, a policy that stabilizes nominal wages when it is mostly goods prices that are sticky or stabilizes goods prices when it is mostly wages that are sticky has very bad properties. the differences across exchange rate regimes are much less significant than those across domestic procedures within the same regime.
The results reported above concerning the properties of the various combinations of policy activism and exchange rate management are very robust to the parameterization of the model. Changes in the degree of risk aversion, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and so on do not affect the main patterns reported above.
Neither does the use of a Taylor rule that includes an exchange rate target.
Conclusions
The recent literature on the welfare properties of exchange rate regimes typically favors activistic flexible rates over fixed parities. In this paper we have argued that this result hinges critically on the commonly made assumption that the monetary authorities know a lot about the state of the economy (that is, that they can perfectly observe current shocks). This assumption induce a bias in favor of activistic policies. As the flexible exchange rate system is more suitable to the pursuit of activistic policies, these assumptions also induce a bias in favor of this type of exchange rate system. We find that welfare comparisons are not very conclusive in the sense that the differences tend to be small. When the comparison is done on the basis of the standard output volatility criterion, though, a doubly passive regime (money targeting plus a fixed regime) comes on top. Moreover, in this case the differences across regimes are quite substantial for all degrees of policy activism.
Our analysis has also bearing for the recent claims on the unimportance of international policy coordination (Obstfeld and Rogoff's, 2001) . We find that this remains the case even when monetary policy does not undo the effects of the nominal distortions and even when policy activism is not welfare enhancing. 
